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Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial
Power and the Need for a Law of Counts
Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin*
I. Introduction
As this article goes to press, Martha Stewart has just completed her
five-month sentence in a West Virginia federal prison, imposed after her
conviction on four counts of a five-count indictment. Stewart's case has
spawned a cottage industry of commentary. Many have pointed out that
the well-known queen of domestic perfection was not prosecuted for
insider trading-which was the original focus of the government's
investigation and the offense that most casual observers think sent her to
jail-but rather for lying about why she traded, charges that have been
characterized as both "trivial" and "extraneous."' It has also been argued
that, even looking at only those facts most favorable to the government,
the insider trading case against Stewart was extremely tenuous (although
the SEC has now brought a civil petition against Stewart on that
2ground). On these assumptions, some have suggested that the Stewart
prosecution was motivated by sexism or politics, and others view it as
proof positive that federal prosecutors have become godlike in their
* Professors of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
Professor Seigel was a federal organized crime prosecutor in Philadelphia for five years
and a First Assistant U.S. Attorney in Tampa, Florida, for four years. We thank the
participants in the Criminal Law and Procedure Roundtable at Brandeis Law School for
their comments on this article. Professor Seigel also acknowledges the excellent research
assistance of Kelly R. McNeal.
1. John Buell, Is Martha Being Used as a Scapegoat? BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug.
25, 2004, available at www.commondreams.org/views ("[Stewart's] act is trivial in
comparison with an economic and political climate that encourages paper profits, short
time horizons, and exploitation of customers and workers."); Ellen S. Podgor, Jose
Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Should Be Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109
PENN. ST. L. REv. 1059 (2005) (referring to the "extraneous crimes in the Martha Stewart
case").
2. Christopher Westley, Martha Stewart s Surreal Ordeal, at http://www.mises.
org/fullstory.aspx?Id=1453 (calling the insider trading claim "a truly ridiculous charge
when made against someone without any fiduciary responsibility to the firm"). But see
infra note 19.
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ability to convict anyone they want .
The ills purportedly manifested by Stewart's trial and tribulations
range from a paucity of controls over prosecutorial decision-making to
the "pathological" proliferation of vague statutes that criminalize
innocuous or marginally immoral behavior.4 Proposed solutions to the
types of problems evidenced in the Stewart case include more stringent
self-regulation of prosecutors based on "proportionality" or "neutrality"
principles,5 adoption of continental practices that better train and monitor
prosecutors,6 and giving judges the power to "nullify" overbearing
prosecutorial charging decisions.7 The consistent concern underlying
these proposals is that prosecutors have too much discretion.
This article uses the Stewart case to take a closer look at the various
types of discretion prosecutors wield. Unlike some other commentators,
we are not persuaded that the case against Stewart was brought in bad
faith or that it was unwarranted at its core. As we discuss in the first part
of this article, prosecutors had ample reason for investigating her conduct
and charging her with a crime.
At the same time, for reasons advanced in the second section of this
article, other prosecutorial decisions made in her case give us greater
pause. In particular, we critique an aspect of the Stewart prosecution that
has yet to be the subject of sustained analysis, having to do with a
phenomenon that we call "redundant charging." That phrase refers to
3. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About
Equal Justice In U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN L. 247, 247 (2003)
(claiming that the Stewart prosecution was infected with sexism at many stages); see
also, Buell, supra note 1 ("Putting Stewart in her place is a strategy designed to appeal to
insecure working class males whose votes Bush needs but whose interest he serves only
through symbolic politics."); Harry Browne, What the Martha Stewart Case Means to
You, available at www.harrybrowne.org/articles/MarthaStewart2 (using the Stewart case
to bolster the claim that "modem America [is] a place where anyone can be charged with
anything").
4. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons
from Current White Collar Cases, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 194 (2005) ("Federal
prosecutors are subject to minimal supervision and are authorized to make independent
decisions that, with few exceptions, are not subject to approval or direction."); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of the Criminal Law, MICH. L. REV. 505, 517 (2001)
("Federal criminal law probably covers more conduct-and a good deal more innocuous
conduct-than any state criminal code.").
5. Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723 (1999); Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wisc. L. REV. 837.
6. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law
Reform: How Do the French Do It, How Can We find Out, and Why Should We Care?,
78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 617 (1990) (advocating adoption of the continental charge
screening process); Moohr, supra note 4, at 218 (suggesting that the "imbalance produced
by prosecutorial power" could be addressed by adopting "the safeguards that constrain
prosecutorial power in inquisitorial systems.").
7. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 569.
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prosecutors' nearly unrestricted ability to manufacture closely related
charges based on the same course of conduct. After describing the
problem, we propose that courts develop a "law of counts" to remedy it.
II. The Decision to Investigate and Charge Stewart
Far more white-collar crime takes place in the United States than
federal prosecutors have the resources to pursue.8 As a result, only a
small percentage of this alleged criminal conduct is targeted for federal
prosecution. A close look at the winnowing process reveals that
prosecutors-and even criminal investigators-play a smaller role in
selecting cases for criminal treatment than is commonly believed. Most
of the time, white-collar investigations are initiated, not by members of
the Department of Justice, but by employees of regulatory agencies such
as the SEC, IRS, or EPA. Often the administrative investigation is
triggered by a flag raised during a routine screening process. In other
cases, the conduct would have escaped official notice (as most white-
collar crime probably does) but for a citizen's tip-for example, from an
estranged spouse, a nosy neighbor, or a disgruntled shareholder or
employee.
Most white-collar crime detected by the government is fully
disposed of at the regulatory level.9 On occasion, however, agency
personnel decide, for one reason or another, that the behavior of the
putative defendant warrants a criminal investigation. 10 Even then, when
lower level bureaucrats make such a determination, some form of
supervisory review takes place to confirm that a referral for criminal
treatment should be made. Thus, only a small percentage of white-collar
cases ever make it to the U.S. Attorney's doorstep.1
Even fewer cases get in the door. Due to their relative lack of
resources, U.S. Attorney's Offices usually employ a set of intake
guidelines to screen out potential cases that are too insignificant to
8. See Heminway, supra note 3, at 252 ("federal investigators have only limited
resources available for use in pursuing possible violators. Accordingly, each prosecutor
or enforcement agent must pick and choose those against whom the laws within its
jurisdiction will be enforced.").
9. See Cynthia Barnett, FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division, The
Measurement of White-Collar Crime Using Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Data 6,
available at www.fbi.gov.
10. Statutory formulations, which typically distinguish civil versus criminal liability
based upon whether the defendant's conduct was "willful" (see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff),
are not very helpful in separating out cases for potential criminal treatment, because
almost all white-collar malfeasance is willful (as opposed to reckless or negligent). Thus,
agencies often rely on other factors, such as the magnitude of the harm or fraud, the
criminal history of the subject, and the reaction of the subject to the investigation, in
deciding whether to make a criminal referral.
11. See Heminway, supra note 3, at 261-65.
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warrant a federal prosecutor's attention. These guidelines vary from
office to office, administration to administration, and crime to crime.
1 2
They depend to some degree on Department of Justice priorities as well
as local conditions. If an agency refers a matter that does not meet the
guidelines, it is promptly declined. If the matter meets the guidelines, it
is assigned to an Assistant United States Attorney for evaluation and
further development.
Although outsiders can only make educated guesses, something
akin to the process just described appears to have taken place in Martha
Stewart's case. On December 28, 2001, the value of ImClone stock
dropped a precipitous sixteen percent after the announcement that the
Food and Drug Administration had declined to review ImClone's key
cancer drug, Erbitux. As a matter of routine policy, regulators at the
SEC examined the trading of ImClone just prior to its steep decline,
looking to see if any insiders or relatives of insiders had traded the stock
before the bad news became public. They immediately discovered that
both children of ImClone CEO Sam Waksal had, in fact, traded ImClone
shares on December 27, one through a Prudential Securities account and
one through Merrill Lynch. Inquiries at Merrill Lynch revealed that Sam
Waksal had also attempted to sell his own shares of ImClone on the same
day, but could not; to its credit, Merrill Lynch blocked the trade. Waksal
then transferred these shares to his daughter's account and tried to sell
them through her. Once again, Merrill Lynch refused to execute the
trade. 13
It must have been around this time that SEC investigators
discovered Martha Stewart's December 27 ImClone trades from her
Merrill Lynch account. One can only imagine their reaction at seeing
such a famous name appear in the midst of their investigation. They
quickly figured out that Waksal and Stewart were close friends. This
raised the specter-wrong as it turned out-that Stewart had traded after
12. Generally speaking, DOJ's prosecutorial guidelines, found in the United States
Attorney's Manual, are open to the public, but office-by-office intake guidelines are not.
See Green & Zacharias, supra note 5, at 843 n.23 (referring to individual prosecutorial
offices' non-public intake guidelines). In the experience of one of the authors (Seigel),
who served as a prosecutor for nearly a decade, internal guidelines are written to be
flexible enough to take special situations into account. These might include pursuing a
prosecution that does not otherwise meet the guidelines because it is believed that it will
lead to other, bigger cases; pursuing a case that manifests a special federal interest; and
pursuing a case that will have a greater deterrent impact than its size objectively
indicates. Obviously, this creates a huge pocket of discretion in which prosecutors can
and do operate.
13. The timing of the actions set forth in this paragraph can be established by a
careful reading of the Waksal and Stewart indictments, especially the conspiracy to




receiving an inside tip from the company's CEO. 14 The SEC continued
its administrative investigation. On January 7, 2002, SEC staff attorneys
interviewed Peter Bacanovic, Waksal's former employee as well as his
and Stewart's broker at Merrill Lynch. 5 On January 8, the SEC issued a
voluntary request for production of documents to ImClone.
It was only at this point, sometime between January 8 and January
25, that the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office joined the investigation.' 6
Thus, the U.S. Attorney's Office's determination to participate in the
Stewart case came only after the SEC's discovery of her potentially illicit
trading and its initiation of an official inquiry. From the public record, it
is difficult to discern whether the prosecutors were asked aboard by
agency investigators or instead read about the case in the media and
joined the investigation on their own. Either way, at the time they
became involved there was significant circumstantial evidence
suggesting that Stewart had committed insider trading as a classic tippee,
evidence that could not be ignored.
Of course, the possibility exists that prosecutors decided to pursue
Stewart's case for suspect reasons, based on sexism, a political agenda,
or a desire to bask in the media limelight. But in a high profile case like
Stewart's, the conscientious prosecutor is strongly motivated to take a
leading role early in the investigation to ensure that no embarrassing
missteps take place. Further, it is perfectly legitimate to target
conspicuous violators so that the deterrent effect of criminal law is
maximized.1 7 Perhaps most important, if a high profile case identified by
the SEC were not aggressively investigated under his or her watch, the
U.S. Attorney would undoubtedly be accused of favoring the rich and
14. If Stewart had traded on a tip from Waksal, she would have been a classic tippee
and liable under well settled insider trading law. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655-56
(1983).
15. See United States of America v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (citing Appendix A entitled "Redacted Superseding Indictment," 1 24) [hereinafter
Stewart Indictment].
16. Had the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York been
involved any earlier, it would have participated in the January 7 interview.
17. Apparently the SEC routinely targets high-profile defendants. See Vikram
David Amar, The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 171,
178 n.13 (2004). But courts have refused to find that this type of practice constitutes a
violation of the equal protection clause or some other discrimination principle. Falls v.
Town of Dyer, Ind., 875 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A government legitimately
could enforce its law against a few persons (even just one) to establish a precedent,
ultimately leading to widespread compliance."); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864,
864 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding an IRS policy targeting notorious tax protesters); People
v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 A.D.2d 12, 21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) ("Selective
enforcement may... be justified when a striking example or a few examples are sought
in order to deter other violators ... ").
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famous.' 8  All of these considerations likely influenced the U.S.
Attorney's decision to join and pursue the securities investigation.
But what about the prosecutors' ultimate decision to charge Stewart
for lying, rather than insider trading? We again can only speculate as to
why the latter charge was not brought. Clearly, the original theory of the
case-that Stewart had traded on a tip from the company's CEO-did
not pan out; instead, the tip had come solely from inside the brokerage
house. Although the lower courts have thus far agreed that trading on
such a tip constitutes a violation of the insider trading law,' 9 the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on a case in which a putative inside trader received
her tip from a misappropriator. There are several reasons why the U.S.
Attorney's Office might not have wanted Stewart's case to be the one to
test that proposition in the latter forum (where Stewart surely would have
taken it). First, Stewart had the resources to mount the most vigorous,
expert defense. Second, the mere fact of Stewart's notoriety might give
her a tactical advantage; subconsciously, judges and justices are more
likely to have sympathy for someone with fame and fortune.20  Third,
losing to a celebrity at the Supreme Court level would be a conspicuous
black eye for the Department of Justice. Better, then, to place this issue
on the civil side-which the current SEC case against Stewart does-
where the government's burden of proof is lower (critical to success on
the mens rea issue) and where a loss would not be so harmful to the
government's prestige.
But then why not leave Stewart alone? Others have expressed
concern over what have been aptly named "sideshow" charges,
especially when those charges are primarily based on denials of other,
more substantive (alleged) criminal conduct. 21  That concern is
18. Imagine, for instance, if the prosecutors investigating the Kobe Bryant case had
not charged him with rape, even though it now appears that their case was weak. See
Gary Tuchman, Judge Drops Charges against Bryant, available at http://www.cnn.
com/2004/LAW/09/01/bryant.trial/ (quoting Jeffrey Toobin as saying, "It is a disgrace
that these prosecutors have brought a case on such flimsy grounds.").
19. Criminal cases holding that there is liability in this situation include United
States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1119 (1997); United
States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); United States
v. Falcone, 97 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (reluctantly following the holding in
Libera). Regulatory cases imposing such liability, which are precedent for criminal
cases, include SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v.Grossman, 887 F. Supp.
649 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); SEC v. Musella, 748 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
20. Thus the saying, "There but for the grace of God go I."
21. Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business
Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer s Clash with Donaldson over
Turf the Choice of Civil or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced
Cooperation, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 456-57 (2004) (noting that prosecutions on
cover-up charges prevent a public trial on the core charges and that such charges are "an
end-run around the more difficult to prove, yet suspected (and hyped), actual offense").
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appropriate in some cases. 2 2  But Stewart's cover-up went beyond a
simple denial;23 as we detail in the next section, the prosecution also had
solid reason to believe that Stewart had made numerous false statements,
altered evidence (if only momentarily), and suborned perjury by her
broker.
In short, at the time of charging, the prosecution reasonably could
have believed that Stewart had done something plainly wrong, separate
and apart from trading on inside information. She not only gave into the
understandable but regrettable human instinct to dissemble when
confronted with a hand in the cookie jar, but she also tried to muddy the
evidentiary trail and lasso a colleague into covering up the swindle.24
Stewart's conduct may have been near the threshold where prosecutors
should avoid filing an indictment. But her conduct was not "trivial."
And the charges were not "extraneous" to the criminal justice system's
legitimate goals of punishing blameworthy actions and ensuring the
efficient prosecution of criminal acts.25
III. The Decision to Charge Stewart with Five Counts
While we think the decisions to investigate Martha Stewart and
prosecute her for her cover-up was justifiable, we are more troubled by
the number and type of charges filed against her. The indictment in the
Stewart case is an illustration of the tremendous power prosecutors have
to shape the contours of a crime and to split it up--perhaps arbitrarily-
into many different but overlapping counts. In order to explore these
issues further, we begin with a description of that document.
22. Stuart Green has written an article that explores this issue in some detail. Stuart
P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005)
(manuscript on file with authors).
23. It was in such cases that the exculpatory no doctrine, which required dismissal of
false statement charges based solely on a denial of wrongdoing, was most likely to apply
before it was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S.
398 (1998). While we are uncomfortable with Brogan, given the extent to which it
permits prosecutors to trap unwary defendants, the doctrine would not likely have applied
in Stewart's case, given the elaborate nature of her coverup story. See generally Scott
Pomfret, A Tempered "Yes" to the "Exculpatory No," 96 MICH. L. REv. 754 (1997).
24. See Green, supra note 22, at 30 ("Destroying evidence or perjuring oneself in
response to a governmental investigation involves more than just the usual breach of the
supposed duty to obey the law"). That the conduct Stewart covered up may not have
been clearly illegal arguably only makes her cover-up more culpable. Id. at 34 ("[I]t is
ironic that the more serious the crime being covered-up, and the more severe the penal
consequences, the stronger is the defendant's claim of self-preservation, and arguably the
less wrongful is his act of covering up.").
25. The jury agreed. Specifically it found that, in addition to making nine separate
false statements to government authorities, Stewart conspired to make false statements,
commit perjury (by Bacanovic), and obstruct an agency proceeding. United States v.
Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Cedarbaum, J.).
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A. The Indictment
The indictment against Stewart begins with a conspiracy count and
alleges that Stewart and Bacanovic conspired to obstruct justice, make
false statements, and commit perjury. But the forty-one numbered
paragraphs that comprise this count also provide virtually all the
allegations supporting the subsequent false statement and obstruction of
justice charges. Thus, this part of the indictment must be described not
only to understand the conspiracy count but also to grasp the
government's entire case against Stewart.
The first twenty-one paragraphs of the conspiracy count provide the
government's version of why Stewart sold her shares in ImClone. The
indictment details how Bacanovic, Stewart's broker at Merrill Lynch,
discovered that Waksal, the president and chief executive officer of
ImClone, called in an urgent order to Merrill Lynch to sell all his
ImClone stock on the morning of December 27, 2001.26 It also notes the
probable reason Waksal was so persistent about selling at that time: the
Food and Drug Administration was about to deny approval for his
company's vaunted anti-cancer agent, Erbitux. In fact, the public
announcement of the denial was made the next day.
27
On the morning of December 27, the indictment alleges Bacanovic
called Stewart to tell her about the Waksal transaction. He was unable to
reach her, however, and simply left a message that he thought ImClone
"is going to start trading downward." Since he was on vacation, he
directed Douglas Faneuil, his assistant, to tell Stewart about the Waksal
order if and when she called back. When Stewart did return Bacanovic's
call, Faneuil told her that Waksal was trying to sell all of his ImClone
stock, at which point she directed Faneuil to sell all of her ImClone stock
as well. 28 That sale provided her with $45,673 more than she would have
received had she waited to sell until the next business day when the news
became public, after which ImClone's stock value declined
approximately 18%.29
At no point prior to the sale was Stewart told why Waksal was
selling his stock or the source of information about his sale. The
indictment alleges, however, that Waksal and Stewart were personal
friends, implying that she knew the reason for Waksal's action. The
indictment also points out that Stewart had been a licensed security
broker from 1968 through 1975, that she had served on the board of
26. Stewart Indictment, supra note 15, 1 13. This paragraph also alleges that a
member of Waksal's family was put in an order to sell his stock.
27. Id. 12 & 19.




directors of the New Stock Exchange for about four months in 2002, and
that Merrill Lynch policy specifically prohibited its brokers from
revealing information about one client's transactions to another unless
there was a "need to know" about such matters. 30  These allegations
insinuate that both Stewart and Bacanovic engaged in a knowing
violation of RulelOb-5, the insider trading law, 31 he as the "tipper" (who
misappropriated confidential information) and she as the "tippee" (who
knew the information was misappropriated). As noted above, however,
Stewart was never formally charged with that offense.
The next twenty paragraphs of the indictment, still within the
conspiracy count, describe the various schemes that Stewart and
Bacanovic allegedly devised to hide the real reason Stewart sold her
ImClone stock. Although there were several such schemes, it is
important to recognize that they all centered around one decision. As the
indictment put it, Stewart and Bacanovic "agreed that rather than tell the
truth about the communications with Stewart on December 27, 2001,
they would instead fabricate and attempt to deceive investigators with a
fictitious explanation for her sale-that Stewart sold her ImClone stock
on December 27 because she and Bacanovic had a pre-existing
agreement to sell the stock if and when the price dropped to $60 per
share."32  All of the remaining actions the indictment attributes to
Stewart and Bacanovic were directed at maintaining this "sale-at-sixty"
story.
Focusing solely on the allegations as they pertain to Stewart, the
indictment next alleges that, once Stewart learned federal investigators
were seeking an interview with her, she changed the phone message from
Bacanovic that had read "Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is going to
start trading downward" to "Peter Bacanovic re imclone" (although she
almost immediately told her assistant to change the message back to the
original wording).33 It also alleges that she made several false statements
30. Id. 1111 12,2&6.
31. Insider trading is not expressly forbidden by statute. Rather, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 proscribes fraud in connection with trading of securities, and the
SEC has promulgated a rule ("10b-5") that criminalizes, in connection with the trading of
securities, schemes to defraud, the making of statements that are untrue or misleading, the
omission of statements necessary to make a statement not misleading, and a transaction
that operates as a fraud or deceit. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
32. Stewart Indictment, supra note 15, 23. Interestingly, the jury acquitted both
Stewart and Bacanovic on the charge that they lied about their agreement to sell ImClone
when it went below $60.00 (the only two false statement specifications on which they
were acquitted). See United States v. Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (Cedarbaum, J.). However, the jury also clearly found that the sale-at-sixty
agreement was not the reason the ImClone stock was sold. See id.
33. Stewart Indictment, supra note 15, 26. Although the latter act could mean she
had a change of heart with respect to altering evidence, it more likely evidenced her
20051 1115
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during the ensuing interview, an interview that was conducted by
members of the SEC, the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney's office on
February 4, 2002, with Stewart's lawyers present. Specifically, the
indictment avers, Stewart made the following false statements during the
interview: she had an agreement with Bacanovic that he would sell her
ImClone shares when ImClone's price reached $60 per share; she did not
know whether Bacanovic's phone message of December 27 was recorded
on her phone message log; she talked to Bacanovic (rather than Fanueil)
on December 27 and much of that conversation was about her
company's stock; and Bacanovic had not yet informed her that he had
been questioned by the federal government.34
Federal agents also interviewed Stewart by phone on April 10,
2002. The indictment alleges that, on this occasion, Stewart made
several other false statements, to wit: she did not recall discussing
Waksal or his sale of ImClone stock on December 27 with anyone from
Merrill Lynch; she and Bacanovic had agreed to sell her ImClone stock
when it reached $60 a share; and Bacanovic had told her on December
27 that ImClone was selling below that amount.35 The conspiracy count
ends by alleging that all of these statements, as well as those made during
the February 4 interview and the manipulation of the phone log, were in
furtherance of the conspiracy to make false statements and obstruct
justice.36 The conspiracy to commit perjury allegation is less clearly
delineated, but is based on a combination of Bacanovic's false testimony
under oath to an SEC officer repeating the "sell-at-sixty" story and the
fact that Stewart made several calls to Bacanovic both the day before and
the day of this testimony.
37
The rest of the indictment, as it pertains to Stewart, is relatively
brief. The two false statement counts, based on 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a),
incorporate the paragraphs already described and are based on the same
allegations. The indictment includes two false statement counts because
there were two meetings between Stewart and federal investigators, the
February 4 office interview and April 10 phone interview.38 The
obstruction of justice count, under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, references the same
paragraphs in the conspiracy count that the false statements counts
reference and is based on precisely the same conduct as those counts.
39
realization that her assistant had witnessed the change and thus would be able to expose
the alteration. The defense made no effort to defend this behavior during trial.
34. Id. 1 27.
35. Id. 1 36.
36. Id. 37.
37. Id. 140-41.




The final count against Stewart is the most innovative. It alleges
that she committed securities fraud under 1Ob-5 when she repeated the
"sale-at-sixty" story and various sub-components of it to the Wall Street
Journal, the public at large, and a securities analysts' conference, all in
an effort to mislead investors and bolster the value of her own company's
stock.40 The trial judge, Miriam Cederbaum, acquitted Stewart on this
count, reasoning that the prosecution did not prove that Stewart made
these statements with the intent to defraud. While Stewart may have
known the statements were false and that they would be widely
disseminated, there was no evidence that she or her lawyer "reached out
to," "chose," "organized," or decided to "take advantage of' the fora for
these statements and thus, Judge Cederbaum concluded, there was no
evidence of the necessary intent.4 1
The judge allowed the other four counts to go the jury, however.
Stewart was convicted on all four. Judge Cederbaum ordered that
Stewart be imprisoned for five months and serve five months under
house arrest, the lowest possible sentence she could receive under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and that she pay a fine of $30,000, the
highest possible fine she could be forced to pay under the Guidelines.4 2
Although Stewart has appealed all four convictions, she eventually
decided to waive bail pending the outcome of the appeal. Her term of
imprisonment began on October 8, 2004. 43
B. The Problem: Charge Redundancy
The foregoing description of Stewart's indictment reveals our
concern about charge redundancy. As we concluded earlier, Stewart
clearly took enough steps in her efforts to hide her malfeasance from
40. Id. 56-67.
41. United States v. Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Cedarbaum, J.).
We think the judge's reasoning on this score is suspect. A person can have many
motivations for doing something, and can be found criminally guilty even if only one of
these motivations furnishes the necessary intent to commit the crime. Here, Stewart
appeared to be trying to accomplish many things by falsely proclaiming her innocence;
the jury surely could have found that one of them was to reassure nervous investors, the
mens rea necessary to commit the crime. So, if the issue was intent, the charge should
have gone to the jury. The better route, in our opinion, would have been for the judge to
declare that the theory of criminal liability set. forth in this count of the indictment
violated Stewart's First Amendment right to make a simple public declaration of her
innocence. Note, however, that by construing it as a factual issue and entering a
judgment of acquittal instead of considering it a legal decision and dismissing the count,
the judge insulated the matter from government appeal.
42. Constance L. Hays, Martha Stewart s Sentence: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2004, at Al.
43. Constance L. Hays, As Stewart Enters Prison, Her Company Refurbishes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at C4.
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investigators that she deserved to be charged with some type of crime.
But that single cover-up resulted in five separate charges. Telling the
sale-at-sixty story and related fibs to federal agents on February 4 gave
rise to two crimes: making false statements and obstruction of justice.
When the story was repeated during a separate interview, a third crime of
making false statements occurred (and presumably another obstruction
charge could have been added). Had she been found to possess an intent
to deceive, a fourth crime would have occurred when she told the story to
the public. And when she consulted with Bacanovic to make sure the
story would stick, she committed afifth crime.
In fact, prosecutors in Stewart's case were conservative in their
approach. In each of the false statement counts, they identified as
"specifications" particular statements made by Stewart that were
allegedly untrue: eight in count three and three in count four. Under
existing case law, prosecutors could have charged each of these lies as a
discreet false statement, resulting in eleven § 1001 counts instead of just
two. 44  Moreover, nothing prevented prosecutors from seeking out
Stewart for further discussions, presumably resulting in more false
statements, or even asking her to testify under oath before the SEC,
resulting in the possibility of multiple perjury counts.45 In addition, the
longer the investigation lingered, the more often Stewart could be
counted on to declare her innocence in public fora. Each of these
occasions would, in theory, be a new "execution" of securities fraud-
and another potential count.46 As long as Stewart stuck to her story, and
as long as her lawyer let her talk, the counts would pile up.
How is this possible? And what are the consequences? We explore
the answer to these questions by looking at three possible sources of
limitation on redundant charging: the federal criminal code, the
Constitution, and the federal sentencing guidelines.
44. See United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
("Where false statements are made in distinct and separate documents requiring different
proof as to each statement, the filing of each false document constitutes a crime, and each
filing may be alleged in a separate count of the indictment.").
45. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2004).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 1996) (when an act is
"chronologically and substantively independent" from the other acts charged as the
scheme, it constitutes an execution); United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 595 (11 th Cir.
1995) (a single scheme can be executed a number of times, and a defendant may be
charged in separate counts for each "execution" of the scheme to defraud); United States
v. Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853, 861n. 16 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1059, 115 S.Ct.
668, 130 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1994) ("[T]wo transactions may have a common purpose but
constitute separate executions of a scheme where each involves a new and independent
obligation to be truthful.").
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1. The So-Called Criminal Code
One might assume that the substantive criminal law would impose
meaningful limitations on redundant charging. A rational legislature
should seek to avoid promulgating numerous overlapping and vague
criminal provisions. Unfortunately, this assumption is incorrect, at least
in connection with federal criminal law. There is, of course, a body of
law that deals with crime on the federal level, most of which can be
found at Title 18 of the United States Code; indeed, Title 18 is often
referred to as the United States' "criminal code." But this moniker is
misleading. The name implies that a committee of lawmakers and
scholars met at an historic place and time to organize the common law of
crimes into a coherent body of law setting forth criminal conduct and the
penalties faced for engaging in it. The name further implies that this
committee, or a successor group of experts, periodically reviews the
operation of the code and suggests additions and modifications to it.
This scenario does describe, more or less, the creation and maintenance
of some areas of American procedural law, such as the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.47 But it does not even remotely represent the
manner in which the federal "criminal code" has evolved.
Unlike its procedural cousins, the substantive federal criminal law
consists of statutes passed on an ad hoc basis. As a political body,
Congress addresses criminal issues from a political standpoint and passes
criminal laws to satisfy the outrage of the day. It pays scant attention to
how the new statutes fit with the old ones. Congress pays equally little
attention to how the penalties for one crime can be squared with the
penalties imposed for another. Many new criminal statutes tend to
(1) duplicate or at least significantly overlap with ones in place;
(2) incorporate existing crimes into a new, overarching scheme; or
(3) plug a hole discovered in existing law, but with little effort to make
the law a rational whole. Although the statutes are subjected to an
internal bureaucratic process that places them alphabetically by topic in
Title 18 (or occasionally, somewhere else in the federal titles), the
resulting "code" is a mess in every sense of the word, as many
commentators have recognized.48
47. See The Rulemaking Process: Judicial Conference Procedures, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm.
48. The following description of the federal code is representative:
The current federal criminal code, title 18 of the United States Code, makes
"the federal criminal law almost incomprehensible." It is hard to understand,
hard to apply, and hard to explain. Title 18 is a compilation, rather than a code,
and it is duplicative, ambiguous, incomplete, and organizationally nonsensical.
It has aptly been described as "an odd collection of two hundred years of ad
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Given the breadth and variety of the federal criminal code, it is
likely that a defendant's behavior will potentially violate a multitude of
overlapping criminal statutes, especially where white-collar crime is
involved. The same course of fraudulent conduct, for example, might
constitute mail fraud (if the mails have been used to carry part of it
out); 49 wire fraud (if a telephone or the internet was used as part of the
execution of the scheme); 50 securities fraud under Title 18 (if the fraud
was related to securities); 5' securities fraud under Title 15 (if the fraud
was in connection with the purchase or sale of securities); 52 false
statements to an agency of the government (if an agency, including the
SEC, was one of the "victims" of the fraud) under Title 1 8;53 and false
statements to the SEC under Title 1.5 4 If two defendants are involved, a
conspiracy charge can likely be added. And if, as with Martha Stewart
and Peter Bacanovic, the defendants attempt to cover up their fraud once
an investigation begins, they will probably be liable for a second
conspiracy and the additional substantive crimes of false statements,
obstruction of justice,55 and perjury.56
Nothing in the code tells a prosecutor how to sort through these
options. Thus, she can bring every one of these charges as long as she
believes each element can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And a
prosecutor's choices do not end there, because she must also decide how
many times the defendant committed each crime. For example, the
crime of mail fraud is not measured by the overall scheme; it is defined
as the use of the mails to execute that scheme. Thus, courts have held
that every time a defendant mails a letter in connection with his fraud,
the defendant has engaged in a discrete violation of the statute.57 A
hoc statutes, rather than a unified, interrelated, comprehensive criminal code."
Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible? 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
195, 195 (1997). See also Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Curious History and Distressing
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing
Guideline Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 382-83 (2004) (noting
"the general confusion created by the absence of meaningful congressional
classifications" of economic crimes).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2005).
50. Id. § 1343.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2004).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2002); see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32; 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (2002) (prohibiting the making of false statements to the Securities and Exchange
Commission).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (relating to perjury generally) or § 1623 (relating to
perjury before the grand jury or court).
57. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (upholding charging each
mailing sent in execution of scheme as a separate count); United States v. Vaughn, 797
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similar approach is taken with false statements under § 1001 and false
claims under 18 U.S.C. § 287; courts have held that each false statement
or claim is a separate violation of the respective statutes. 58 Therefore,
during one ongoing course of conduct, the same substantive criminal law
can be, and often is, violated multiple times.59
In short, the federal criminal code places virtually no restraints on
redundant charging. Instead, through its design and application it creates
and exacerbates the problem.
2. The Constitution: Double Jeopardy Doctrine
One inclined to reduce redundant charging of the sort just described
might naturally think of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause
as a source of restriction. After all, that clause prohibits multiple
prosecutions or punishments for the "same offense., 60 To the extent that
a multi-charge, multi-count indictment smacks of piling on, this
prohibition might reasonably be thought to apply. But it doesn't, at least
under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the double jeopardy
prohibition.
There are numerous ways "same offense" could be defined for
double jeopardy purposes. The most rigid, of course, would be to take it
literally. But no court has done so in modem times. At the least, courts
have considered an offense and its lesser-included offenses the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes, a test that has been called the
"same element" test. At the other end of the spectrum, some courts have
adopted a "same transaction" test, which holds that the double jeopardy
clause requires the prosecution to join at one trial and punish as the same
crime "all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single
criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.', 61  Somewhere in
F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding defendant's conviction on four counts of mail
fraud, each relating to a separate use of the mails); cf United States v. Poliak, 823 F.2d
371 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding defendant's conviction for ten counts of bank fraud based
on ten kited checks).
58. With respect to false statements, see supra notes 44 and 46; see also Fain v.
United States, 265 F. 473 (9th Cir. 1920) (in a prosecution against an agent of General
Land Office for making and presenting false claims against the United States by means of
an itemized statement of expenses, several items of which were alleged to be false, each
item could be regarded as a separate violation of § 287 and constitute a separate count of
the indictment).
59. The most egregious example of this phenomenon that we have been able to find
at the state level is Krueger v. Coplan, 238 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.H. 2002), where state
prosecutors charged ninety separate counts of sexual assault based on one twenty-five
minute sex act caught on video. While critical of the prosecution's charging decision, the
court held it was technically correct, given the way the statute defined the crime.
60. U.S. CONST., amend V.
61. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
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between is the "same conduct" test, which looks at the extent to which
the conduct underlying two charges is the same.62
The Supreme Court's vacillations on the same offense issue are too
nuanced to be described in detail here. Suffice it to say that the Court
now subscribes to the same elements test, after flirting with the same
conduct test. In Blockburger v. United States,63 the Court held that, in
the absence of clear legislative intent, two offenses are normally different
for double jeopardy purposes when "each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not." 64  A few subsequent cases
suggested that the Court was willing to broaden this test under certain
circumstances, 6 and, in Grady v. Corbin,66 the Court formally adopted a
version of the same conduct test. But three years later, in United States
v. Dixon,67 five members of the Court reversed Grady because it had no
"constitutional roots," conflicted with longstanding precedent, and was
confusing to apply. 68 Dixon reinstated the Blockburger test as the default
rule for defining "same offense" when determining whether multiple
prosecutions are permitted.
Under the Blockburger test, a false statement charge and an
obstruction of justice charge are separate offenses because the former
statute requires proof of a false statement while the latter does not, and
the latter statute requires proof of intent to impede an impending
proceeding while the former does not.69 Conspiracy to engage in these
actions is yet another separate offense because it requires proof of an
agreement.7v Thus, in the Stewart case, the prosecution could have
subjected Stewart to several different trials without violating the double
jeopardy clause.
Most prosecutors would not want to do so, of course, if not from a
sense that multiple prosecutions would be oppressive, then simply
(describing the "same transaction" test).
62. See generally, CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 871-73 (4th ed. 2000).
63. 284 U.S. 199 (1932).
64. Id. at 304.
65. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (holding that conviction of
felony murder for participation in a death caused during a robbery barred a later robbery
prosecution, even though robbery and felony murder-a killing during any felony--each
require proof of an element the other does not); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980)
(dictum stating that if the prosecution had to prove a failure to slow his car in order to
prove homicide, conviction on the former charge would bar a separate trial on the latter).
66. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
67. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
68. Id. at 704-11.
69. U.S. v. Wood, 958 F.2d 963, 973 (10th Cir. 1992).
70. Cf United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992) (ruling that conspiring to sell




because of efficiency concerns. More important as a practical matter is
whether, when the charges are tried in one trial and all lead to conviction
(as occurred in Stewart's case), the sentences can be stacked. Although
the history described above demonstrates that the Supreme Court has
been somewhat opaque regarding the definition of same offense in re-
prosecution cases, it has been very clear as to that term's meaning in
connection with multiple punishments. In Missouri v. Hunter,71 the
Court held that legislative intent alone determines the scope of the "same
offense" analysis for determining when cumulative punishments may be
imposed,72 and that when legislative intent is not ascertainable, the
Blockburger test applies. 7 3 Since Congress has not made clear whether
consecutive sentences are permissible for the false statement and
obstruction of justice laws, or for conspiracy to commit those crimes, the
apposite same-offense rule in Stewart's case is the Blockburger test.
Because, as explained above, that test treats all of these crimes as
separate offenses, Judge Cederbaum could have imposed consecutive
sentences for the two false statement charges, the obstruction charge, and
the conspiracy charge without violating the double jeopardy prohibition.
The outcome is the same for a whole host of similarly worded
white-collar crimes, because each technically requires proof of a fact the
others do not. Mail fraud, false statements, false claims, and obstruction
of justice are all separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes.74 One
case has even held that the crime of making false statements (which
requires lying about a "material" fact) and the crime of making false
statements to secure a passport (which only requires making "any false
statement") are different crimes under the Double Jeopardy Clause.75
Note further that even if the Court were to reverse Hunter and adopt
the "same transaction test" or something similar for multiple punishment
analysis, prosecutors could still engage in redundant charging. As long
71. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
72. Id. at 368.
Where . . . a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment
under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the
"same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction
is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may
impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.
Id.
73. Id.
74. Cf United States v. Green. 964 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1992) (sentence for mail
fraud may be enhanced on obstruction of justice grounds even though conduct for the
latter was the basis of conviction for mail fraud).
75. United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1lth Cir. 1984). See also
United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1963) (false statements to
immigration authorities under 18 U.S.C. § 1546 a different offense than false statements
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
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as they joined all crimes that are considered the "same offense" in the
same indictment, they could avoid violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Although they would also know that the punishments for these crimes
could not be imposed consecutively, that might not provide much of a
deterrent to redundant charging, for reasons developed below.
3. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
At this point, some knowledgeable readers might be asking: so what
if prosecutors engage in redundant charging? Any resulting unfairness
can be corrected after conviction by collapsing similar counts at
sentencing. Because that is what happens under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, complaints about redundant charging in federal cases might
be discounted as much ado about nothing.
There can be no dispute that the Guidelines are designed to
minimize the effects of multiple charging.76 Part D of Chapter 3 of the
guidelines deals with multiple counts. The preamble to this section
specifically states that its purpose is "to limit the significance of the
formal charging decision and to prevent multiple punishments for
substantially identical offense conduct., 77 It accomplishes this objective
by grouping offenses together for sentencing purposes.
The grouping of counts depends on the type of conduct. For
example, most relevant to Martha Stewart's case, Section 3D1.2(b)
provides that "[w]hen the counts involve ... two or more acts or
transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting
part of a common scheme or plan" they should be grouped together. In
contrast, the guideline most applicable to fraud cases, Section 3D1.2(d),
instructs that counts should be combined when "the offense level is
determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the
quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate
harm." In the first example, the base offense level is that of crime with
the highest offense level in the group; in the latter instance, it is the
offense level corresponding to the aggregated quantity.78
76. See Moohr, supra note 4, at 181 n.68 ("The Sentencing Guidelines require that
similar charges be grouped, thus mitigating somewhat the effect of multiple
charges .... ).
77. U.S.S.G. Manual, Introductory Comments to Part D.
78. U.S.S.G., § 3D1.3, 18 U.S.C.A. This discussion assumes, of course, that the
guidelines will survive Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), in one fashion or
another. See United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (striking down, as a violation
of Blakely's requirement that sentence enhancements be found by a jury, the provision in
the guidelines that makes them mandatory). Note also that Blakely's requirement that
sentences be based on facts found by the jury exacerbates the problem discussed in this
article, by requiring prosecutors to include all conduct they want considered by the
sentencing judge in the indictment. This requirement will undoubtedly result in more
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Given this scheme, multiple charging is not likely to affect the time
served by a defendant as long as the prosecution has included a sufficient
number of charges in the indictment to cover the maximum guideline
sentence. It is for this reason that, despite multiple charges, Stewart
received a sentence of only five months in prison and five months of
house arrest. It is also for this reason that redundant charging might
seem like a benign phenomenon. But it is not. That is because the
Sentencing Guidelines only work their count-collapsing magic after
conviction, when much of the damage from redundant charging has
already occurred.
C. The Harms of Redundant Charging
Most prosecutors are smart people, skilled lawyers, and rational
actors. If redundant charging were innocuous, prosecutors wouldn't
waste their time doing it. In fact, prosecutors know or intuit that
bringing multiple, duplicative, and overlapping charges provides several
tactical advantages.
First and foremost, prosecutors bring multiple charges for similar
conduct because it maximizes the probability of conviction at trial on at
least one of the charged counts. Put bluntly, more charges lead to more
convictions, perhaps even when some jurors entertain a reasonable
doubt. Understanding how this might happen requires an appreciation of
the dynamics of jury deliberation.
Consider first a case in which differences between jurors persist
despite deliberation. If only one count is charged, one of three outcomes
can result from the jury's split: conviction (if some arms are twisted),
acquittal (if other arms are twisted), or a hung jury (if the arm-twisting is
unsuccessful). The latter two outcomes are anathema to the prosecution.
But if the prosecutor places two or more counts in the indictment, a split
among jurors can result in a fourth possibility: a compromise verdict of
guilty on some charges and not guilty on the others.79 Unless the
maximum sentence for the former charges is significantly lower than the
sentence for the rejected charges, this split verdict is a complete victory
counts, as prosecutors realize that conduct not charged in the indictment cannot affect
sentence. Compare United States v. Benitez-Hernandez, No. 8:04CR317, 2004 WL
2359668 (D. Neb. Oct. 19, 2004) (holding that sentence enhancements may be charged in
indictment even if not offense elements) with United States v. Jardine, No. C.R.A. 04-
219, 2004 WL 2314511, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2004) ("this Court will not countenance
the Government's attempt to leave irrelevant and prejudicial information in the
Indictment 'as a protective measure' 'in anticipation' of pending Supreme Court cases.").
79. The phenomenon of juries nullifying the law by splitting the difference between
plaintiff and defendant is well known in civil cases. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Civil Jury
Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1601, 1606-18 (2001).
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for the prosecution because the judge does not take the acquittal into
account at sentencing. Yet the jury is likely to think otherwise; it will
generally be unaware that its compromise had no impact on the ultimate
outcome in the case.
A slightly different way in which multiple counts might cause a
conviction despite a lack of jury unanimity occurs when, as Stewart's
attorney suggested in his closing argument,81 jurors horse-trade counts
after discovering they can't agree on any particular one. In essence, they
might say to one another, "I'll give you count 1 if you give me count 2."
That type of pact can only occur, of course, if there is more than one
count.
In both of these compromise verdict scenarios, "the jury dishonors
the reasonable doubt standard, because each faction on the jury
surrenders its honestly held beliefs on the question of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." 82 That alone is cause for concern. But redundant
charging can also have other, more subtle, unfortunate effects. For
instance, some jurors simply bristle at the prospect of rubber stamping
the prosecution; multiple counts enable these jurors to demonstrate their
independence by rejecting some charges without acquitting the defendant
altogether. Splitting the verdict also allows jurors to feel they have
demonstrated a capacity to obey instructions to consider each count
separately and facilitates their ability to look a likable defendant in the
eye and say, in effect, "I did what I could for you." In all likelihood,
these influences seldom produce erroneous decisions. On the margin,
however, the effect of making conviction psychologically more palatable
for jurors increases the probability of conviction in each case, and thus
over time it increases the overall number convictions obtained by
prosecutors.
Redundant charging can skew plea bargaining as well. Most
obviously, multiple charges intimidate defendants. On its face, a multi-
count indictment can make the potential sentence look devastatingly
80. See U.S.S.G. § IBI & 3 (setting forth "relevant conduct" to be considered at
sentencing).
81. See Closing Argument of Robert Morvillo, March 2, 2004, at p. 10, available at
www.marthatalks.com/trial-update/closing-argument.html ("The one thing you cannot
do is compromise. You can't say, I'll give you Count 2 if you give me Count 3. I'll give
you Count 3 if you give me Count 4. Because one count of conviction, it's over for us. It
doesn't make any difference which count it is. If you convict on one count, we feel the
consequences of that conviction as if you convicted on all counts, so please don't
compromise.").
82. Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 784 (1998). Muller continues "To be sure, compromise
verdicts are undoubtedly quite common, and they help to resolve cases, avoid retrials, and




long. In the case of Stewart, for example, the sentences on the five
counts added up to some twenty years in jail.83 True, given the existence
of the Guidelines, the long sentence is normally an illusion, something
that the defense attorney presumably explains to the terrified defendant.
At best, however, that explanation only lessens the intimidation, since
the Guidelines permit a judge to depart upward from a guideline sentence
if certain factors are met.
84
Further, in a situation analogous to the jury dynamic described
above, defendants may be more willing to give up on a valid defense
when they can trade, and trading is more likely when there are multiple
counts. As Stephanos Bibas explains, "[o]vercharging... provides high
anchors for defendants. If the initial charge and sentence serve as
anchors and baselines, any prosecutorial concessions look like discounts
or savings-wins for defendants instead of reduced losses. ' 5
Multiple charges may also have an effect on defense attorneys
engaged in plea bargaining. Defense attorneys like to "win" their cases
as much as any attorney. At the same time, there is considerable
pressure on defense attorneys to resolve cases efficiently, through
pleading their clients guilty in the bargaining process. One way to
resolve the tension between these two forces is to define a "win" as a
reduction in counts. Even if this reduction will not amount to a shorter
sentence, defense attorneys can tell their clients that their superior
negotiating skills forced the prosecutor to "drop some charges," a claim
that many clients are likely to think is more than cosmetic. This ruse is
not just a way defense attorneys can make themselves feel better about
representing clients who are convicted. The danger is that it also makes
it easier to represent those clients inadequately.86 Prosecutors are surely
aware of this dynamic, and may use redundant charging to take
advantage.
Redundant charges might be rationalized at sentencing. But that
does not explain why the practice takes place in the first instance. It
persists for a reason, actually for several reasons. And many of those
reasons should not be sanctioned if we want convictions based on a
83. Hays, supra note 42.
84. See generally U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1-2.18 (1987).
85. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REv. 2463, 2519 (2004).
86. Cf Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, The Skeleton of Plea Bargaining,
NEW L.J. 1373, 1374 (1992) (under the current plea bargaining system, the defense
attorney's "concern is no longer with the sufficiency of the State's evidence but with
admonishing the defendant not to be foolhardy and insist upon a trial... [B]y becoming
the 'left hand' of the court while the prosecutor is the 'right hand' the defense lawyer
accepts and adopts the system of discounts and penalties which the prosecution relies
upon to obtain pleas.").
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unanimous jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and plea
agreements that reflect the actual culpability of the defendant.
D. Proposal
We believe that the power of the prosecution to charge multiple,
overlapping, and redundant crimes ought to be curtailed. In a perfect
world, the problem would be fixed by Congress, as part of a larger
project of building a truly comprehensive and coherent criminal code.
Such a code could, akin to Chapter D of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, contain rules limiting duplicative charging. Nudging the
definition of same offense in double punishment analysis toward the
"same conduct" or "same transaction" test would provide further
incentive to avoid double charging. But the chances of either occurring
are infinitesimal.8 7 Therefore, we advance a proposal that is not quite as
bold but is more attainable: we suggest that the courts use their common
law power to create a "law of counts."
Under the law of counts, a court would conduct a pre-trial review of
an indictment to determine if the charges in it were duplicative and
overlapping in a manner jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair
trial.88 In so doing, the court could be guided by the same conduct
analysis of Supreme Court double jeopardy doctrine8 9 and the grouping
rules found in the Sentencing Guidelines. The idea would be for the
court to merge, for purposes of plea bargaining, as well as the jury's
87. With respect to congressional action, one has only to recall the nineteen-year
long attempt to reform the federal criminal code, spanning 1968 to 1984, that ended in
complete failure. See Joost, supra note 48, at 202. Expansion of the same offense
definition is even less likely, given the Court's decision in Dixon. See supra text
accompanying notes 63-68.
88. The topic discussed here should be distinguished from "duplicitous" charging,
which has received more judicial attention. As explained by the Sixth Circuit, "a
duplicitous indictment is one that charges separate offenses in a single count." United
States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988). The Stewart indictment was
duplicitous in the sense that it contained several specifications of false statements in one
count. In such situations, the trial court must be careful to instruct the jury that it must
unanimously agree that at least one of the specified events occurred in order to convict on
that count. See U.S. v. Blandford, 33 F.3d. 685, 699 (6th Cir. 1994). The law of counts
we are advocating deals with a different problem: multiple counts for the same course of
conduct.
89. Another well-thought out stab at the "same offense" doctrine which might be
particularly helpful in developing a law of counts is found in George C. Thomas, A
Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L
REV. 1027, 1069-70 (1995) (arguing that when legislative intent is unclear, as is usually
the case, all "blameworthy act-types"-repetitive acts that "manifest the statutory harm in
the same way" and are not "individuated by intent"--should constitute the same offense).
Under Thomas's definition, all of the counts in Stewart's case should have been collapsed
into two (conspiracy to commit perjury and making false statements). Id.
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deliberation and verdict, all counts that deal with the same conduct or
transaction. We are not claiming that this analysis would be an easy
task; we do believe, however, that the gradual process of the common
law would be the perfect vehicle for the development of a counts
doctrine.
We also acknowledge that the law of counts could never completely
eliminate redundant charging. The courts would still have to follow clear
congressional intent concerning specific crimes and the harms they are
designed to deter and punish. So, for example, we do not believe that the
practice of charging a conspiracy to commit a crime and the related
completed crime would be altered. We do believe, however, that if a
prosecutor were to bring, for instance, separate mail and wire fraud
charges for the same essential conduct, or a dozen separate mail fraud
counts for each mailing furthering the same scheme, the court should
exercise its common law power to merge all of the charges into a single
count.
The authority to do so could come from the due process clause,
separation of powers doctrine, or administrative law. Under the
fourteenth amendment, courts are obligated to ensure that the
adjudication process is fair.90 Under separation of powers doctrine,
courts have the authority to monitor prosecutorial decisions that affect
sentencing, a traditionally judicial function.91  Under principles
developed in the administrative law arena, courts routinely review the
rationality of decisions made in the executive branch.92 As Ronald
Wright's paper for this symposium issue indicates, New Jersey courts
have for some time relied on these types of rationales, in particular the
latter two, when regulating various types of prosecutorial charging
decisions.93
90. In the charging context, the Supreme Court has only been willing to recognize a
due process violation when the charging decision is "vindictive," Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974), and it has very narrowly construed the equal protection clause.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). But state courts have been willing to
think more expansively. For instance, in People v. Marcy, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated that "separate statutes proscribing with different penalties what ostensibly might be
different acts, but offering no intelligent standard for distinguishing the proscribed
conduct, run afoul of equal protection under state constitutional doctrine." 628 P.2d 69,
75 (Colo. 1981).
91. See State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 611 n.5 (N.J. 1977) (noting that
"sentencing is a judicial function" and holding that to the extent prosecutorial charging
decisions trench on that function, separation of powers might be violated).
92. Id. at 615 (noting that even if prosecutor's decisions are viewed as purely
executive in nature, "[t]he judiciary is commonly called upon to review the rationality of
decisions by other branches of government or agencies with special expertise.").
93. Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey,
PENN. ST. L. REv. 1087 (2005) (describing the Leonardis decision, as well as subsequent
New Jersey cases).
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We noted above that the law of counts would be most effective if
applied at a preliminary hearing, before serious bargaining takes place.
Alternatively, it would be reflected in the judge's instructions to the jury.
Either way, the judge's decision on the counts issue would be appealable,
to permit fashioning a uniform approach. Over time, the law of counts
would exert pressure on prosecutors to modify their charging practices,
resulting in fewer multi-count indictments.94 In this way, charging
would become less redundant and more accurately reflect the alleged
culpability of the defendant.
IV. Conclusion
Martha Stewart's case illustrates a wide variety of prosecutorial
decision-making. We have defended the U.S. Attorney's decision to
investigate and prosecute Stewart, but called into question the further
decision to charge her with five counts. As a way of curtailing the
redundant charging phenomenon, which is widespread, we have
suggested that the courts develop a law of counts to cabin prosecutorial
charging discretion.
Ideally, perhaps, prosecutors could be relied on to self-regulate in
this area. But we think it is unrealistic to expect prosecutors to limit their
investigative tactics and change practices in substantial ways when the
courts and legislatures feel no need to do so. Public and official pressure
to get tough on crime is immense, as illustrated by the Department of
Justice's recently reiterated directive that federal prosecutors pursue the
maximum charge supported by the evidence.95 It doesn't help that most
state prosecutors are elected and that federal prosecutors also care deeply
about their public reputations. With respect to the white-collar criminal,
which Stewart may not epitomize but certainly exemplifies, the pressure
to prosecute aggressively has become particularly intense since Enron
and related corporate scams.96 Further, obtaining convictions under
complex fraud statutes is often very difficult, especially when the
defendant possesses significant resources, as many white-collar
defendants do. Prosecutors understandably want to cover all their bases
by piling on as many charges as possible.
94. Again, the New Jersey experience provides a model for this approach. See
Wright, supra note 93 (describing judicial monitoring of charging decision in New Jersey
through appealable decisions regarding the prosecutor's adherence to statewide charging
guidelines, developed after judicial pressure to do so).
95. See United States Attorneys' Manual ("USAM") 9-27.300 (directing prosecutors
to file the most serious readily provable offense).
96. See, e.g., Janet Whitman, Stock Options Face Scrutiny in Wake of Enron, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at B7B (commenting that the collapse of Enron created a public
outcry for greater accountability of corporate boards of directors and executives).
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Thus, our proposal to create a law of counts would not require
prosecutors to act against their short- or long-term interests. Rather, it
would be implemented by judges using the interpretive method, without
going so far as to confer on them an undefined "nullification" authority.
If instituted wisely, it could have a significant impact on prosecutorial
discretion without unreasonably curbing it or preventing government
from bringing bad people to justice.

